Monocacy National Battlefield: Cultural Resources Study

Reed, Paula

This project as amended, is to provide a detailed historic resource study of the properties included within the Monocacy National Battlefield, site of a crucial clash between Jubal Early's Confederate forces, numbering some 15,000 and a small, hastily assembled band of no more than 6,000 Federals under General Lew Wallace. Early was en route to Washington DC to attack the national capital, relieve pressure on Robert E. Lee's beleaguered Army of Northern Virginia at Richmond, and to liberate thousands of Confederate prisoners confined at Point Lookout. The battle occurred on Saturday, July 9, 1864, near the end of the Civil War, but at a time when the Confederacy still had formidable armies. The Union defenders were protecting three bridges across the Monocacy River, two carrying major highways and one conducting the B&O Railroad. By the end of the day, the Federals had been routed, but they did manage to delay Early's progress long enough for General Grant to detach enough manpower from the Richmond area to return to the capital city's defense. Early, therefore, was not able to accomplish his mission, and General Grant's policy of military aggression continued, eventually overpowering the Confederacy. Early's invasion north of the Potomac River in the summer of 1864 was the third of three Confederate advances into Union territory. All three had occurred in the summer: September of 1862, June-July of 1863, and July of 1864. All three targeted the same area of central Maryland and the Cumberland Valley, with designs on south central Pennsylvania. So, by July of 1864, the citizens of Frederick County perhaps anticipated the annual event. In fact the area fought over in the contest for the Monocacy bridges was the s~me that accommodated both armies in 1862, where Lee's Special Orders 191, directing his Army's movements through Maryland and into Pennsylvania were lost or left for the Union Army to find two days later. In 1863, Union forces passed through the same area and encamped en route to locate and confront Lee's army in Pennsylvania, near Gettysburg. These repeated visitations to central Maryland were not accidental or coincidental. Lee's invasions were well planned and calculated to maximize advantages to the Confederate army. Why did Robert E. Lee choose the same area for all of his incursions into the North? His reasons in all three cases were strategic, although the details of his plans varied. His overall goals were the same in all cases, to sway the public opinion of war weary Northerners to pressure Congress into a negotiated settlement; to replenish the Confederacy's depleted stores of cattle, horses, grain and gear; and to entice European powers to aid and support the Confederacy through Lee's show of force in the North. By moving into and through central Maryland and south central Pennsylvania, Lee availed himself of some of the most agriculturally productive farmland in America. Countless letters and diaries penned by Confederate soldiers attest to the lushness of the landscape, a marked contrast to the war-torn, ravaged and depleted farms of Virginia. Routing through central Maryland and south central Pennsylvania gave Lee access to several of the nation's major transportation routes: the National Road, the Georgetown Pike, the B&O Railroad and the C&O Canal were all leading east-west transport corridors. Running north-south were prominent highways through the Cumberland and Shenandoah Valleys, a railroad through the Cumberland Valley, leading to Harrisburg; and through the Piedmont were highways to Harrisburg and Philadelphia. Harrisburg was an objective because rail lines serving the Northeast converged there. Additionally, Lee could use the mountain ridges, which ran from northeast to southwest to protect the flank of his army as it advanced, or withdrew.

Monocacy National Battlefield: Cultural Resources Study

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